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I. Preliminary Remarks
C onflict o f law s has changed fundam entally in the last decade(s) as a resu lt o f 1 the activities o f the E uropean legislator. A longside the international conven tions and the -now som etim es overruled -national law, a set o f un ified rules applicable to cases w ith a relationship to a foreign ju risd ictio n and foreign law has been enacted on the E uropean level. In alm ost all conflict o f law s fields, the hitherto applicable national rules have been replaced b y directly applicable E uropean regulations, e.g. the rules on international ju risd ictio n in civil and com m ercial m atters (R egulation 44/2001, hereafter 'B russels I R eg u latio n ') as w ell as on the law applicable to non-contractual ("R om e II") as w ell as co n tractual m atters ("R om e I"), in all E uropean M em ber States.
A. The B asic Principles o f C onflict o f Law s
Basically, in all cases w ith a foreign elem ent, e.g. w hen the dam age is incurred 2 in one state b u t the harm w as actually caused in another, conflict rules set out to achieve tw o goals: Firstly, international cases should be decided in harm ony, i.e. different ju dgm ents from different courts dealing w ith an identical case are to be avoided and secondly, every case should be subject to the law o f the ju risdiction to w hich the closest connection exists; no national law should be applied to a case w ithout any substantive connection to the geographical, p er sonal or other general circum stances.
In order to secure these objectives, tw o fundam entally different b u t interrelated 3 sets o f rules m ust be applied concordantly. First o f all, the rules on internation al jurisdiction m ust be consulted in order to find a court to determ ine the case. Secondly, the conflict rules provide the answ er to the question w hich respec tive national substantive law should be applied b y the court seised. E xperience show s that som e national courts tend to apply their ow n substantive law (lex fo r i) w ithout any further consultation o f the conflict rules because th eir own substantive law (scil. their lex fo r i) is the law the ju d g es are m o st fam iliar w ith. H ow ever, this approach contradicts the principle o f international legal harm ony: Skipping the te st on conflict o f law s w ould allow the (m erely alleg edly legitim ate) claim ant to choose a court an d thereby a legal system w hich does n o t have the closest connection to the case at h and b u t has other aspects favourable to the claim ant, e.g. it m ay aw ard v ery h igh am ounts o f dam ages or have a particular evidence schem e.1 The conflict rules, as m eta-law ,2 prevent this k ind o f fo ru m shopping b y assigning ju s t one national law exclusively to the case, regardless o f w here the claim is litigated. H ow ever, this positive ef fect w as subject to lim itation since, up until the recent E uropean unification, the conflict rules them selves w ere only national substantive rules: D ifferent conflict rules, originating from different leges fo r i, assigned different national substantive law s to the one case. Therefore, the E uropean harm onization o f th e rules on international jurisdiction and th e conflict rules are o f exceptional significance since their unification and th e fact th at th ey prevail over national law ease the above-m entioned problem s to a v ery large extent: B asing their decision on th e sam e rules to determ ine the com petent court seised and th e law applicable to cases w ith a foreign elem ent, every E uropean court o f w hatever national jurisdiction, refers ultim ately to the sam e substantive law.
4
The considerations described above are the b est exam ple o f the legal principles derived from the logics o f conflict o f law s on a m ethodological level. T hey are, how ever, only one p art o f the legal principles governing th e m ethodology o f this particular field o f law. In addition, the general principles derived from th e substantive law ultim ately applied m ust alw ays b e considered w h en new conflict rules are to be p u t into legislation, existing rules are to b e interpreted or w hen loopholes in the existing codes or case law have to be closed. Such an approach is constitutive, since last b u t n o t least substantive law, international jurisdiction and conflict rules are p art o f the sam e jurisdiction, w hich should n o t be contradictory in itself but establish a coherent system o f legal ru les.3 1 It is, however, reasonable to recognize a right of a claimant to choose between different courts ac cording to his specific action when it comes to certain fact patterns (infra no. 10). Such a choice is, however, regarded as forum shopping when it is made to alter that party's substantive legal entitle ments to his own advantage or, accordingly, to the disadvantage of his opponents. As a result, the law would no longer be providing a certain and predictable norm, neutrally applied between the parties. Cf. R.J. Weintraub This is supported b y the fact that m ost principles o f substantive law are deter m ined and w ell-docum ented on a broad com parative basis. Furtherm ore, it is easier to observe these principles at a supra-national level, since in this context the legislator is n o t constricted b y individual national interests b u t broadened by supra-national am bition. H ence, supra-national com parative analysis o f the law ultim ately applied should be taken into consideration w hen an y legislation or legal practice in the area o f conflict o f law s is concerned and m u st be co n sidered w hen conflict rules are to be enacted or interpreted.
B. R elevant scenarios for questions o f aggregation an d divisibility o f dam ages
It should com e as no surprise that an area o f law w hich deals at best w ith ques-5 tions o f bilateral contracts or road traffic accidents as w ell as transnational m ar riages does not cover questions o f aggregation and divisibility o f dam age to a great extent. Consequently, literature covering this specific question is alm ost absent. Furtherm ore, one has to be aw are o f the basic paradox o f conflict rules: Specific legal concepts such as aggregation and divisibility o f dam age cannot be determ ined w ithin the conflict rules since these rules contain m aterial reference to the underlying legal problem only as far as the respective principles o f the law ultim ately applied are concerned.4 Nevertheless, from the perspective o f the logic o f conflict o f laws, one m ay quite bluntly assume that in general any aggregation o f dam age in term s o f com petent courts and applicable law certainly fits better into the above-described principles o f this area o f law: I f dam age is internation ally split and occurs in several national jurisdictions, the efforts to have a single com petent court and especially a single applicable law m ay be antagonized.
H ow divisibility o f dam age, e.g. in cases o f different dam age from the sam e 6 cause, different consequential dam age from the sam e direct dam age and, fi nally, different dam age from sim ilar poses problem s for the pursuit o f the latter objectives o f the conflict o f law s regim e is illustrated below b y m eans o f two different scenarios basically dow ngrading the specific problem s in the Q u es tionnaire to term s and realistic fact patterns in conflict o f laws. 
II. International Jurisdiction
A. Introduction 7
The needs o f the com m on E uropean m arket m eans the E uropean legislator has long been active in the area o f international ju risd ictio n .5 A s early as in 1968 the B russels C onvention on Jurisdiction and the E nforcem ents o f Judgm ents in C ivil and C om m ercial M atters6 w as adopted b y the M em ber States o f the E uropean C om m unity and cam e into force in 1973 in the EC M em ber States at that tim e.7 Subsequently, the B russels C onvention w as am ended b y four ac cession conventions until it w as replaced for fourteen8 o f the th en fifteen EC M em ber States by R egulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the R ecognition and E nforcem ents o f Judgm ents in C ivil and C om m ercial M atters ("B russels I R egulation")9 adopted b y the EC Council in D ecem ber 2000, w hich entered into force on 1 M arch 2002. The Regulation, like the C onvention earlier, lays dow n rules on direct jurisdiction, applicable by the court seised o f the original action in determ ining its ow n jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcem ent o f judgm ents given in other M em ber States o f the E uropean U nion in w hich the R egulation applies. In contrast to the prior Convention, the R egulation is directly applicable in the M em ber States under art. 249 (2) EC Treaty.10 8 The m aterial scope o f the B russels I R egulation is defined b y its art. 1 w hereunder the R egulation applies only to civil and com m ercial m atters. H ence, for the B russels I R egulation to be applicable, the subject m atter o f the dispute m u st be o f a "civil o r com m ercial nature"} 1 Consequently, the R egulation does n o t apply to a dispute betw een a private person and a public authority arising out o f acts b y the public authority in the exercise o f its pow ers as such, b ut on the other hand, is applicable w hen neither p arty to the dispute is a public body or w here a public body w as n o t acting in exercise o f its official p o w ers.12 5 Cf. 
11
To begin w ith, the court has already decided upon facts w hich correspond to som e extent to Scenario 1 above involving a horticultural com pany in the N etherlands, m ainly depending on the w aters o f the R hine for irrigating its plants, w hich suffered from the pollution o f the riv e r's w ater b y the discharge o f saline w aste from a potash m ine established in F rance.17 U p to this decision concerning the w ording o f art. 5 (3) B russels I R egulation it w as particularly unclear w hether the courts o f the country w here the w rongful act took p la c e (i.e. F rance) or the courts w here the resulting infringem ent o f the p ro te cted right arose (i.e. T he N etherlands) had jurisdictio n over the m atter.18 The ECJ held that the text m u st be understood as covering both the place w here the infringem ent -a n d not only the dam age -occurred19 and the place w here the event giving rise to it took place and, as a rationale, referred to the respective equal proxim ity o f both courts to the w rongful conduct or the infringem ent sustained -w ith the result being that the defendant m u st be sued, at the choice o f the plaintiff, either in the courts at the place w here the infringem ent o c curred o r in the courts at the place w here the event giving rise to it occurred. It m u st be noted that these two options are n o t exclusive vesting jurisdiction in b oth the courts o f the state w here the harm occurred and at the place o f w rongful conduct is highly problem atic: To b egin w ith, it w as unclear w hether a particular court is at the place w here the harm occurred or w here the w rongful conduct took place. F urtherm ore, at first glance the solu tio n m ight am ount to a situation w here the victim co uld basically obtain the rig ht to com bine several courts o f jurisdiction, e.g. suing the publisher in E ng lan d and France respectively, an d each tim e in respect o f the full dam age.
T he E C J becam e aw are o f this preposterous invitation to fo r u m sh o p p in g and 13 tried to correct the consequences b y introducing certain lim itations on the choice o f the plaintiff: Firstly, the court draw s a d istinction betw een the initial injury and consequential losses, and it refuses to p erm it a p la in tiff to sue in the courts o f any place w here he has m erely suffered pure econom ic loss co n se quential on an initial infringem ent o f his protected rig h t sustained elsew here. H ence, only the prim ary infringem ent o f the p rotected rig h t is relev an t for the assessm ent o f the com petent court u nder art. 5 (3) B russels I C onvention.22 This rule extends to secondary victim s w ho m ay o nly sue in the ju risd ictio n w here the prim ary victim w as harm ed. Finally, in the libel case above, the court h eld that the publisher could be sued in the place o f the w ro n g fu l co n duct, i.e. at his establishm ent for a ll the harm caused b y the defam ation, or before the courts o f each country w here the publication w as distributed and caused dam age. H ow ever, in the latter case, the courts o f each co untry have ju risd ictio n so lely in respect o f the dam age ca u sed within th eir ow n terri tory.23
It should n o t autom atically be assum ed th at the lim itations proposed b y the Eu-1 4 ropean C ourt entirely solve the problem s o f divisibility o f dam age as regards international jurisdiction. In cases o f infringem ent o f personality rights, for exam ple, the rule th at neither indirect dam age suffered elsew here th an in the original place nor dam age suffered b y secondary victim s vests ju risd ictio n in national courts, leads to a situation w here a p la in tiff claim ing com pensation for his m ental affliction suffered in E ngland an d brought about b y a defam atory publication concerning his son w hich w as distributed only in F rance m ay only sue the publisher in France, but not in England. Correspondingly, the test on w hether a distant harm is adequately consequential on an initial injury to give jurisdiction to a local court m ay render rather p o o r results, e.g. if a Parisian law yer w ants to sue in France arguing that defam atory statem ents, although spread b y the defendant in E ngland only, have caused h im financial dam age in France b y losing him E nglish clients. Finally, the lim itation on recognition and jurisdiction according to the national borders o f the state w here the harm occurred constitutes a return o f the court to the actor sequitur fo ru m rei rule, adm ittedly w ith a certain shift tow ards the courts w here the harm occurred. 
.] w here he is one o f a num ber o f defendants in the courts f o r the p la c e w here any one o f them is dom iciled."2*
A pparently, this exception to the general rule o f art. 2 B russels I R egulation -17 presum ably stipulating a jurisdiction other than that o f the d efen d an t's dom icile -substantially aggravates the danger o f m isuse b y resulting in proceedings b e ing brought against a num ber o f defendants w ith the sole object o f ousting the ju risdiction o f the particular courts w here one o f the defendants is dom iciled. A ccordingly, tw o general conditions o f its application m ust be met. To begin w ith, jurisdiction over a connected claim against a defendant dom iciled in an other M em ber State belongs exclusively to the courts o f the dom icile o f one o f the other defendants.29 Furtherm ore, the E uropean C ourt o f Justice30 held that, to ju stify th at claim s against various defendants dom iciled in different M em ber States be heard and determ ined b y one single court, there m ust be a connection betw een the various actions brought b y the sam e claim ant against the different defendants o f such kind that it is expedient to hear them together in order to avoid irreconcilable judgm ents.31 W hen this particular condition is m et, does n o t depend on w hether the loss caused is indivisible or n o t:32 T he C ourt clearly referred on several occasions only to the risk o f ju d g m en ts i f decided sepa rately rendering contradictory results, even i f those judgm ents w ere m utually 27 Moreover, this principle is given negative effect by art. 27-30 preventing concurrent actions in different Member States in similar or related issues. 28 Consistently, the Regulation extends to a counterclaim, so as to enable a defendant who coun terclaims against a local plaintiff to join a foreign co-defendant to the counterclaim and simi larly to a claim by a third party (joined by a defendant) against local or foreign plaintiffs. 29 In particular, there is no requirement that one certain claim must be more essential to harm ultimately caused and the court at the "the spider at the centre of the web" is exclusively em powered to hear the multiple connected claims, however small the claimed contributory part by the others defendants might have been. exclusive and could even be executed separately.33 A n y further rem arks on the quality o f the connection necessary, how ever, could n o t be gathered since the E uropean C ourt stated explicitly that it w as "f o r the na tio n a l courts in each individual case w hether that condition is satisfied'' '34 thus basically referring the questions back to the national courts and giving them significantly m ore leew ay w hen assessing possible jurisdiction over m ultiple defendants. 
III. Applicable Law
A. Introduction 1 9 It is w orth reiterating the basic concepts from the start: W hen only the rules on international jurisdiction are applied, the court seised applies its substantive national law, i.e. its lex fo r i and the result o f the case depends on w here it is brought to a national court. Such state o f law has long been considered u n sat isfactory and in particular during the past century several earnest b ut u n su c cessful attem pts at the elaboration o f a unified legal act on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations on a E uropean level have been undertaken The R om e II R egulation covers all non-contractual obligations in "civil a
This research extends to a study on the effects o f art. 28 w ith resp ect to the H ague C onvention o f 4 M ay 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents:41 so far the R egulation is highly unsatisfactory because art. 28 
provides that the R egulation regim e "sh a ll not p reju d ice the application o f international conventions to w hich one o r m ore m em ber states are p a rties a t the tim e when this R egulation is a dopted a n d w hich lay dow n conflict o f law rules relating to n on-contractual o bligations".
Conference, the European Union attempted a more comprehensive agenda and presented a draft convention on the harmonization of the conflict rules in contractual as well as non-contractual obligations also in the early 1970s. See, RabelsZ 38 (1974) 211. With the expansion of the European Community, this ambition ultimately abated and the decision was made to abandon the tort provisions of the draft convention and instead concentrate on conflict rules for contract conflicts resulting in the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980. The idea of a harmonization of the rules concerning non-contractual obligations was revived in the late 1990s, when the European Community acquired in the course of the so-called ''Vienna Action Plan" legislative competence in the field of conflict of laws under art. 61 Unbeknown to P, D puts a noxious chemical into P's water bottle, which is in P's luggage for his trip to State C via State B. While in State B, P gives some of the con taminated water to his dog, which he has taken with him on his journey. Shortly after, the dog starts to vomit, making a mess of P's car. After arriving in State C, P himself takes a sip from the water and consequently falls sick, suffering from stomach cramps. Moreover, whilst still in State C, P has to pay € 150 to the vet for examining his dog. As far as the compensation for the cleaning of the car is concerned, the law of State B would be applied since the dog's poisoning resulted there in the damage to P's car. Accordingly, P's pain and suffering would be determined according to the laws of State C since his condition was sustained there. Only the costs of the vet are a consequential loss and would, hence, be determined according to the laws of State B. Basically, it is understood in all E uropean M em ber States, and, accordingly, 2 5 in the P rinciples o f E uropean Tort L a w (PETL), th at the m ain purpose o f tort law is the restitutio a d integrum -the (full) com pensation o f dam age.50 This basic principle is, how ever, lim ited to the extent th at this dam age is attribut able to the tortfeasor -a rule w isely enshrined in the old rule o f casum sentit dom inus. In addition, it is generally agreed that to rt law has an additional aim o f prevention, since having to com pensate basically has a deterrent effect.51 A ccordingly, these general objectives pursued by substantive to rt law can be translated into term s o f conflict o f law s.52 The general idea o f com pensation and a general focus on the indem nification o f the victim p rim a fa c ie suggests the application o f the lex damni: The v ictim 's legitim ate expectations focus on the protection provided b y the law o f the country w here he participates in public intercourse and, thereby, exposes his rights an d interests to potential infringem ents.53 The victim o f a w rongful act is typically n o t a qualified law- yer; nevertheless, one m ay assum e that he has confidence in the standards o f com pensation at the place w here the harm occurred, v ery often the place o f his habitual residence. M oreover, the developm ent o f system s n ot prim arily based on som e concept o f reproach for m isbehaviour an d w hich instead shift the focus to at least additional or even entirely different aspects such as objective danger ("strict liability")54 m ay support the application o f the lex dam ni.55 A c cordingly, som e authors56 assum e that in m odern to rt law and in the context o f conflict o f laws, a focus on the loss sustained and, thus, the application o f the lex dam ni, is required b y liability for exposure to loss and the fact th at in som e instances o f liability there is, m oreover, hardly an y prerequisite other th an cau sation o f the dam age sustained (strict liability). Finally, an application o f the law at the place w here the harm occurred is considered sim pler in Scenario 2 above: I f m ultiple w rongful acts in different ju risdictions are the conditio sine qua non for one detrim ental result, the application o f the lex dam ni seem s to be the sim ple and straightforw ard solution for the judge. Indeed, in cases o f m ultiple tortfeasors' conduct resulting in only one injury 2 8 as in Scenario 2, the current rule m ay provide acceptable results at first glance. H ow ever, w hen the scenario is varied to a situation w here the conduct results in m ultiple dam age events in different countries, due to the m osaic assess m ent o f the respective losses, the internal recourse o f the respective tortfeasors w ould be entirely corrupted: I f m ultiple tortfeasors are liable u nder several laws, their internal redress m ay be determ ined differently by the law s applied, e.g. in cases w here one law applied has specific provisions w hich exclude a re course action against the other w rongdoers.61 Since according to art. 20 Rom e II R egulation the internal recourse o f the tortfeasors is governed b y the law a p plicable to the respective original claim , the problem o f the m osaic assessm ent w ould be exponentially aggravated and a coherent recourse action betw een the tortfeasors w ould n ot be possible. H ence, the argum ent o f sim plicity m ust also be rejected.
The foregoing general rem arks are not intended as a general argum ent for a 2 9 general application o f the law at the to rtfeaso r's place o f w rongful conduct, but instead to take account o f the fact that tort law in general does n o t focus solely tortfeasor is aware of the applicable standards of conduct; this is most likely in respect of the standards at the place of conduct. Furthermore, the proposition that modern tort law and par ticularly strict liability demands a focus on the loss sustained must be rejected: Liability based on fault is still the core of tort law (See, P. Widmer, Bases of liability, in: European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law (2005) 68; C. v. Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. I (1998) no. 11.) and, in addition, strict liability is not liability for any loss sustained -strict liability regularly covers situations of extraordinary danger requiring a correspondingly extraordinary allocation of responsibility and is applied in cases where a highly significant risk of harm remains despite all proper precautions taken by the defendant. (See, B. A. Koch, Strict Liability, in: European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law (2005) 105.) None theless, there is no clear-cut concept of strict liability, not even within any single jurisdiction. Hence, every proprietor of an exceptional source of danger will assume that the law of the place where this danger is actually situated will be applied to the basis, scope and the design of the respective liability and calculate the risk accordingly. R ather unsurprisingly due to the relatively high aw ards for personal injuries 3 4 in quota and am ount there, it has been m ost notably the E nglish courts w hich have had to address this dilem m a several tim es in recent years. o rig in ally , the E nglish "double actionability rule" required that the to rt w as actionable under the law s both o f forum , i.e. E nglish substantive law, and the ju risd ictio n w here the tort w as com m itted65 -ultim ately leading the E nglish ju d g e to an assess- In addition, a R eview Clause w as im plem ented into the Regulation, dem anding a study on the national differences in com pensation levels n o t later th an 2 0 11.72
The E nglish and E uropean parliam entarians argued th at their solution provides 3 6 a viable solution for the v ictim -he w ill be com pensated according to the stan dards at his habitual residence. A s a consequence, differences in the am ount o f dam ages aw arded in personal injury cases in E urope are adjusted to a very large extent. M oreover, the assignm ent o f dam ages to the v ictim 's place o f habitual residence could support the general m obility o f individuals in Europe since a victim w ould be entitled to com pensation as i f he w as at hom e. L ast b u t not least, P arliam ent argued th at in connection w ith the direct or alternative ju risdiction o f the B russels II Regulation, the assessm ent o f dam ages w ould ultim ately be easier for the judge since the place o f habitual residence w ill regularly coincide w ith the lex fo r i.73
The general lack o f research conducted by the E uropean P arliam ent is best 3 7 illustrated b y the last argum ent: A s explained earlier, the B russels II R egula tio n grants international jurisdiction at m ore places th an the lex fo r i o f the victim , i.e. the place w here the conduct took place, the place w here the harm occurred and, generally, at the habitual residence o f the defendant.74 There m ay be coincidence o f course -b u t not necessarily. N aturally, a court at the habitual residence o f the victim is often m ost convenient for the latter -but, as already illustrated above, the convenience o f the victim is n o t a general stan dard applied in conflict o f law s. H ence, it is to be assu m ed th a t tw o d ifferen t ju risd ictio n s w ill be applicable to the case. W ith the p o ten tial divergence o f the law o f the h ab itu al residence o f the v ictim from the lex fo ri, a further d isadvantage to th is solution becom es obvious: T he law applicable to the case w ill be doubled. F or exam ple, the law at th e p lace w here th e h arm o c cu rred w ill be applied to the prerequisites o f liab ility w h ereas an o th er law, i.e. the law at the h abitual residence o f the victim , w ill be ap p lied to evaluate the consequences o f the w rongful conduct. E ven i f th e lex fo r i and th e law at the hab itu al resid en ce o f the v ictim coincide, a second law, i.e. th e lex dam ni, w ill be applicable to the sam e case. H ence, the solution supplied by depegage is n o t practical at all. This divergence is not lim ited to practical considerations b ut extends to a dog-3 8 m atic unsustainability: A depegage in a single case results in a legal situation form erly non-existent in both o f the law s applied to the case and, hence, differ ent from the legal situation in bo th jurisdictions. This dogm atic inconsistency provokes num erous shortcom ings. ous indem nification o f dam ages and vice ve rsa . In cases w ith strict liability at the place w here the harm occurred and a liability b ased on fault a t the habitual residence o f the victim , a detachm ent o f basis an d resu lt o f liability is n o t only im practical b u t also sim ply preposterous.
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The depeçage solution to the personal injuries dilem m a draw s the protective cloak o f his dom estic jurisdiction around the victim , ignoring the legitim ate expectations o f the tortfeasor. Judges m ay find it obnoxious to have to explain to tortfeasors w hy the am ount o f dam ages ultim ately aw arded to the victim does n o t depend on the specific situation an d the particular case b ut rath er on the habitual residence o f the latter: W hy should liability depend on the q u es tion o f w hether the pedestrian knocked dow n is o f dom estic or foreign citizen ship? It m u st be em phasized that the thin or " egg-shell skull" rule75 does n ot apply here since this basic principle refers m ore to the physical constitution o f the victim than his place o f residence.
4 0 Furtherm ore, countries w ith a low er standard o f indem nification or a barèm e system are n o t likely to em brace a depeçage solution. I f a citizen o f such a country com m its a tort in w hich a national o f a country w ith a h igh standard o f indem nification is injured, e.g. a road traffic accident, the com pulsory liability insurance is obliged to p ay -from the in su rer's perspective -an extraordinari ly high am ount o f dam ages. The paym ent is added to costs th at are u sed to cal culate future prem ium s n o t only for the tortfeasor b u t for the w hole insurance pool, i.e. all other policy holders,76 causing such to increase. M oreover, the above-described criterion o f foreseeability m ust be duly taken into account: I f the tortfeasor cannot reasonably foresee the n eed for insuring at the higher level, it is unfair to im pose the law o f the habitual residence o f the victim for the com pensation o f the latter. account" (em phasis added), m ust be w elcom ed.78 In the face o f the above ar gum ents, the resulting constraint, w hich narrow s the scope an d im petus o f the Parliam ent's am endm ent considerably, should be taken seriously -otherw ise fo ru m shopping to E nglish courts w ould be m aintained in the above-described manner.
IV. Conclusion
W hereas som e national solutions m ay have been the resu lt o f the dem and 4 3 for the protection o f national citizens and m ay be understandable from this perspective, the E uropean institutions recently docum ented a gross m isunder standing o f conflict o f law s in general: The subject is n o t a technical sw itch stand for the overcom ing o f fundam ental differences in national legal systems. It is im possible to circum vent differences resulting from a foreign elem ent by m eans o f policy considerations w hich only focus on the victim an d the best indem nification for said victim . C onflict o f law s is n o t an annex to the exist ing national liability rules b u t a coherent and delicate system in itself, w hich has to be understood in term s o f its principles before significant changes are introduced. H ence, any change m u st be tested against all law -fact patterns in this area o f law. Such a te st is p rovided b y all cases o f divisibility and aggrega tio n o f dam age and should hence be regarded in future E uropean enterprises in this area. 
